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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
WEBER BASIN WATER CONSERVANCY DISTRICT,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

vs.

Case No.
8803

WILLARD A. SKEEN, JOHN G.
BRAEGGER, ELSIE L. BRAEGGER, his wife, et al.,
Defendants and Respondents.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
JOHN G. AND ELSIE L. BRAEGGER

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The statement of facts as related by appellant is sufficiently accurate that we can see no need to take issue as
to those facts. We do not, of course, draw the same inferences nor the same conclusions from those facts. In connection with our argument under each of the points, we
will need to refer for purpose of emphasis to some of the
facts of this case. We shall refrain from mentioning them
further here in order to avoid duplication.
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STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
THE ENTIRE RECORD WILL NOT SUPPORT
THE CONTENTIQN THAT EXCESSIVE DAMAGES WERE AWARDED BY THE JURY
WHILE UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF PASSIO:t'~ OR PREJUDICE.

POINT II.
THERE IS COMPETENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE AWARD FOR SEVERANCE DAMAGE TO THE 36.79 ACRES OF LAND NOT
TAKEN.
POINT III.
ORAL INSTRUCTIONS WERE NOT GIVEN IN
VIOLATION OF RULE 51 OF THE RULES OF
CIVIL . PROCEDURE AND ERROR CANNOT
BE PREDICATED ON THE ADMONISHMENTS
GIVEN THE JURY BY THE COURT.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE ENTIRE RECORD WILL NOT SUPPORT
THE CONTENTION THAT EXCESSIVE DAMAGES WERE AWARDED BY THE JURY
WHILE UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF PASS ION OR PREJUDICE.
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The appellant has devoted pages 6 through 14 of his
brief to quote questions asked by the jury and the answers
of the trial court and of counsel. The excerpts are properly
quoted but we do desire to add these additional statements.
On page 11 of appellant's brief, there is a quotation
from page 187 of the record that concludes with the Court's
statement: "I guess that's a fair statement." The record
then continues (R. 187).
"Mr. Skeen : I think so.
"The Court: I thought I should make that explanation so that you will understand there's no
secrets. This is the first case involving the Willard
Basin, which is, as far as my experience is concerned,
a pioneer first kind of case. We've had many State
Road Commission cases. Several of them were taken
to the Supreme Court, or at least one of them involving the Willard people when the highway was widened before the war down there, you recall. Well,
I guess there's no harm as far as I've gone.
"Mr Mason : I guess not.
"The Court: I could pry the lid off and we'd
all be quarreling here, but it's been so peaceful this
morning, I don't want to get anything started here.
Now, is one-thirty all right? Thank you very much.
Usual admonition."
·

*

*

*

*

On page 14 of appellant's brief, Juror Rich is quoted
as saying, "Well, we need more evidence", and page 341
of the record continues by the Court taking a half-hour
recess. Immediately, upon reconvening, the following statement is addressed to the jury by the Court (R. 341) :
"The Court: Mrs. Rich and gentlemen, with regard to the question asked before we recessed, the

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

4

only answer the court can give you is. to refer you to
the instruction which sets forth how to measure the
damages, and that instruction, ladies and gentlemen,
has been approved by not only the Supreme Court
of our state but practically every state in the union
in these kinds of cases. I make the further comment,
we never try a. lawsuit where the evidence is perfect.
We have to try it on the evidence as presented. Now,
for reasons deemed sufficient to the Court and satisfactory to the parties, this case will have to be decided on the evidence that you've heard. That's the
rules of the game. It can't be any other way. So if
you'll read the instructions over carefully. I don't
claim credit for coining the phrases. We've got
them out of the law books, and it's the best way to
do it. It's the American system. It's the only way
we can do it. Anybody have any further suggestions?
"Mr. Skeen : No.
"And counsel then proceed with their arguments to the jury."
"The right of a juror to ask questions of a witness
during trial is cle-arly within the sound discretion of the
trial court." State v. Sheppard (Ohio), 128 N. E. 2d 471.
In State v. Anderson, 108 Utah 130, 158 P. 2d 127, the
Supreme Court of Utah stated:
"During the course of the trial the court asked
the jury if it would like to ask some questions of a
witness. Two members of the jury accepted this
invitation. Appellants assign this invitation by the
court to the jurors to ask questions as error. Appellants concede that it is not error for a court to grant
permission to a juror who wishes to ask questions
to clarify some material point in the evidence, but
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insist that it is error for the court to · invite the
jurors to ask such questions. Whether. a juror will
be permitted to ask questions of a witness is within
the sound discretion of the trial court. * * *
The fact that the trial court granted the jurors permission to ask questions of witnesses without any
special request from them for this privilege does
not, in our opinion, in and of itself constitute error.
The determining factors as to whether error has
been committed is the type of questions asked and
allowed to be answered. If the questions asked are
not germane to the issues involved or are such as
would be clearly improper and therefore prejudicial
to the rights of the defendants to a fair and impartial trial, the court's allowing them to be answered would be error. As stated in Jones' Commentaries on Evidence, 2nd Ed. Vol. 5, Page 4539, Sec.
2320: 'The privilege of examining witnesses is extended to jurors and may be exercised by them to
draw out or clear up an uncertain point in the testimony. It has even been said that jurors should be
encouraged to ask questions. They should not, however, be permitted to take the examination of witnesses out of the hands of counsel and to question
witnesses at length, nor should they be permitted
to interrupt the orderly conduct of the cause with
unnecessary questions.' "
And the Court continued, after noting the substance· of the
questions asked by the jurors.
"These questions might properly have been elicited on the direct examination of the witness and
were such as would clarify material points in the
testimony. The court, therefore, did not err in permitting these questions to be answered. By so holding, this court does not wish it to be understood that
it approves the practice of a trial court inviting
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jurors to ask questions. This privilege sh-ould only
be granted when in the sound discretion of the court
it appears that it will aid a juror in understanding
some material issue involved in the case and ordinarily when some juror has indicated that he wishes
such a point· clarified." (Emphasis added.)
The action of the jury in the present case fully meets
the language of the foregoing statement that we have italicized. It is certainly far less objectionable that a juror
should request guidance from the court than to secure further evidence from the witness; and appellant makes no
claim that the answers given to these questions by the
Court were anything but proper.
We should note that at no time during the trial of this
cause, either in the presence or in the absence of the jury,
was any complaint made or any objection noted to these
questions by the jury or the answers by the Court. It is
not proper to raise such a question for the first time upon
motion for a new trial and upon appeal. And we must further note that no point is made that the verdict of the jury
was excessive.
We respectfully urge that the action of the jurors and
of the trial court was entirely proper. The jurors sought
information that the Court properly supplied. To now
claim that these jurors did not follow the admonishments
and instructions of the trial court strikes at the very foundation of the American system of trial by jury, and would,
if upheld, permit any litigant who lost in the trial court
to inferentially claim and contend that the jury did not
obey and follow the admonishments and instructions of the
trial court.
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Appellant claims that excessive damages appear to
have been given under the influence of passion or prejudice.
We have demonstrated that no passion or prejudice is
shown to have existed as far as the jury was concerned,
and we very strenuously contend that there has been a
complete failure by appellant to show that the damages
awarded were excessive.

POINT II.
THERE IS COMPETENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE AWARD FOR SEVERANCE DAMAGE TO THE 36.79 ACRES OF LAND NOT
TAKEN.
Appellant contends that the stipulation entered into
and recited on page 20 of appellant's brief negatived respondent's right to severance damage for this s,pecific parcel
of land. We must, of course, take issue with him; and we
believe that the answer is self-evident when this Court reviews the facts of the case. Respondents had a farming
and livestock operation and the approximate 175 acres
were used as a farm unit. To take 137 acres away and pay
only the value of those acres would be manifestly unfair.
There is of necessity a diminution in per acre value when
a farm is reduced from a large acreage to a small acreage.
The stipulation recited in appellant's brief operated to
substantially reduce the severance damage to the 36.79
acres not taken, and the jury certainly viewed it as such
when they allowed only $1850.00 damages for this severance.
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The trial court gave Instruction No. 10 (R. 33), which
reads: as .follows :
· "The property sought to be condemned consti, tutes only a part of the land holdings of the defendants, .all parts of which have been operated as a
unit for farming and livestock operation purposes.
You are instructed that you may include in the just
compensation to be awarded the defendants, the
damages, if any, which will accrue to the portion
not sought to be condemned by reason of its severance from the portion sought to be condemned and
the construction of the improvement in the manner
proposed by the plaintiff. In arriving at such damages you must take into consideration the stipulation
made in open court to the effect that the plaintiff
will grant the defendants the right of possession as
provided in the stipulation until May 1, 1958, and
will construct for the benefit of the defendants a
fence, a road and a ditch, and will provide a permanent right of way for the same to enable the defendants to utilize 36.79 acres of remaining land. The
fence, road and ditch will be constructed before the
defendants' use of the present such facilities will be
disrupted in the construction of the Weber Basin
Project Works. The items of damage to remaining
property are to be separately stated in the verdict."
(Italics added.)
This instruction correctly states the law and the appellant has not excepted to the giving of this instruction.
We contend that this is a full answer to all matters contained under appellant's Point II.
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POINT III.
ORAL INSTRUCTIONS WERE NOT GIVEN IN ·
VIOLATION OF RULE 51 OF THE RULES OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE AND ERROR CANNOT
BE PREDICATED ON THE ADMONISHMENTS
GIVEN THE JURY BY THE COURT.
We cannot agree with appellant that oral instructions
were given to the jury in this cause. Appellant in his argument under this point refers to the portions of the record
quoted on pages six through fourteen of its brief. It would
appear proper to analyze each of the "instructions" of the
trial court as there quoted and determine their effect.
On pages 6, 7 and the top half of page 8 of the brief
of appellant the trial court is quoted in six instances all
dealing with the question of benefit to the condemnor. In
each instance, the trial court in answer to the question of
the juror admonishes them that they may not consider
benefit to the plaintiff condemnor in determining fair
market value and advises the jury that the Court will determine the law. By way of emphasis, may we quote again
a part of the statement of the Court as printed at page 7
of appellant's brief as follows:
"If they (plaintiff) got some sand or gravel or
something like that and it's worth a million dollars
to them, it's none of your business, none of our business."
A part of Instruction No. 14, as actually given, reads
as follows (R. 37) :
"The compensation to be paid to the defendants
John G. Braegger and Elsie L. Braegger, his wife,

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

10
cannot be measured by the value of the land to the
Weber Basin Water Conservancy District but it
'
must ·be determined by the loss and damage to the
said defendants. In other words, what the owner
has lost is the measure, and not what the condemnor
has gained."
'

It occurs to us that the wrong party is complaining
about the so-called oral instructions. That both the oral
statements of the trial court and the written instrctions
contain a correct statement of the applicable law must be
admitted. The oral statements were, however, entirely for
the benefit of the plaintiff and it should not be heard to
complain.
Continuing with an analysis of the questions and answers as set out in appellant's brief, the remainder of page
8 and all of pages 9, 10, 11 and 12, are devoted to questions
and answers concerning income tax features of the award
to be made to the defendants, the respondents here. A fair
inference to be placed on the Court's answers is that he
leaned over backwards to favor the plaintiff and to insure
that no prejudice would result. That these statements were
in the nature of admonishments to the jury is clear and the
appellant could claim error only if the Court had refused
to answer the jury's questions.
And finally pages 13 and 14 concern questions by the
jury and answers by the court as to sand and gravel and
as to use of the word "adaptable." As a preliminary to this
discussion, reference should be made to the prior action of
the trial court in granting the appellant's motion to strike
certain of the witness Capener's testimony as to the value
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of land based upon the quantity of sand, gravel and fill
dirt in it (R. 138).
And,· prior to the question asked by the juror as ·quoted
on page 13 of appellant's brief, the trial court had instructed
the jury by means of written instructions and Instruction
No. 14 (R. 37) contained this language, inter alia, "and
all the uses for which it is most suitable and for which it
is adapted."
The granting of the motion. to strike the evidence as to
v~l,ue based upon quantities of sand and gravel in place, the
giving of Instruction No. 14 and the further statement of
the trial court at page 341 of the record that has been fully
quoted on page 3 of this brief, when considered together,
were correct pronouncements and, under no stretch of the
imagination, could they be said to be prejudicial to the
appellant.
And, finally, we do not believe that an exception to
these alleged oral instructions can properly be noted on
date some three weeks after the final date of trial and the
verdict of the jury. If appellant were to properly attack
the trial court's answers to the jurors' questions, it must
do so timely so as to give that court an opportunity to correct the objection voiced.
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CONCLUSION
We respectfully urge that the points raised by appellant
on this appeal are without merit, that the trial of this cause
was fairly conducted and that the verdict of the jury and
the judgment on that verdict should be upheld.
Respectfully submitted,

GEORGE M. MASON,
JOSEPH C. FOLEY,
Attorneys for Respondtmts.
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